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Comparative Institutional Analysis and Detainee 
Legal Policies: Democracy as a Friction, Not a Fiction 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the development of legal policies regarding detainees 
during the war on terror is viewed uncritically, it is easy to 
understand the cynicism surrounding it. Although U.S. officials have 
asserted that these detentions were ultimately necessary for the 
preservation of democracy, legal pronouncements often seemed far 
more hegemonic.1 Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the 
system of checks-and-balances appeared to have been overdrawn by 
the executive, and neither the legislature nor the judiciary was eager 
to immediately intervene to limit the perceived presidential 
overreach.2 When the Supreme Court finally did, its efforts were 
viewed by some as attempts to seize authority vested by the 
Constitution in the President or legislature.3 The issue of detentions 
during the war on terror quickly spiraled into “only one more 
 
 1. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security: Our 
Security, Our Values (May 21, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/) (“[T]he deci-
sions that were made over the last eight years established . . . a framework that failed to rely on 
our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a 
compass.”); JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL 
RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR x (2007) (“As patriots of democratic freedom 
understand, [actions by the Bush administration] threaten our democracy and the rule of 
law.”); ALASDAIR ROBERTS, THE COLLAPSE OF FORTRESS BUSH: THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY 
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3 (2008) (citation omitted) (noting that in the United States, 
“the Bush administration was alleged to have launched a ‘rolling coup’ against the U.S. 
Constitution”). 
 2. In fact, one scholar has asserted that “[t]he bias towards aggressive action . . . is not 
unique to the executive. Legislators must appear responsive to the life and property interests of 
citizens. In the four months following 9/11, 97 percent of all bills, resolutions, and 
amendments proposed by Congress . . . were related to terrorism.” Laura K. Donohue, The 
Perilous Dialogue, 97 CAL. L. REV. 357, 370 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 3. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that the majority’s decision was “not really about the detainees at all, 
but about control of federal policy”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme [of habeas corpus review for 
foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay] in time of war . . . is judicial adventurism of the 
worst sort.”); John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 574 (2006) (arguing that 
the Court “unwisely injected itself into military matters” and “press[ed] the federal courts far 
beyond their normal areas of expertise”). 
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episode in the never-ending tension between the President exercising 
executive authority . . . and the Constitution,” which “embodies 
some sort of system of checks and balances.”4 The problem was, 
though, that no one within the government seemed to be sorting 
out precisely what sort of checks and balances system was necessary. 
In light of these institutional tensions, it is no wonder that some 
have questioned whether the three branches of government even 
shared the same end-goal of preserving democracy.5 Arguably, 
however, this institutional friction is as much an example of what is 
right with a constitutional democracy as it is of what is wrong with 
it. Created in this case by the exigencies of war, this tension often 
arises when the Constitution does not explicitly delegate to any one 
branch exclusive authority to act, and consequently each branch 
assumes that it must intervene in order to preserve fundamental 
rights.6 The trouble is that “[a] society intent on achieving the 
highest liberty for all runs smack into a basic institutional quandary: 
liberty requires both protection by the government and protection 
from the government.”7  
This problem and the concomitant challenge of “deciding who 
decides”8—particularly as pertaining to detainee issues during the 
war on terror—is the focus of this Comment. Admittedly, the study 
of institutional choice is not novel,9 nor are more general inquiries 
into which branch of government has the institutional competency 
 
 4. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 5. See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); Nadine Strossen, 
American Exceptionalism, the War on Terror, and the Rule of Law in the Islamic World, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 495 (2009) (“[T]he ‘War on Terror’ has violated . . . 
fundamental precepts of the Federalist Society in numerous ways, with devastating 
consequences for liberty, democracy, and national security alike.”). 
 6. See Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional 
Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721, 724 (2007). 
 7. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 43 (1994); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case brings into conflict the competing demands of 
national security and our citizens’ constitutional right to personal liberty.”). 
 8. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 3. 
 9. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle 
for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225 (2005); 
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order 
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 106–14 (2009); Adrian Vermeule, 
Judicial Review and Institutional Choice, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557 (2002). 
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to address particular vexing questions.10 But, as explained more fully 
below, existing scholarship has failed to provide comprehensive 
answers regarding how and when power ought to be allocated 
between, and exercised by, the government’s three branches.11 For 
the most part, these failings have occurred because the executive, 
legislature, and judiciary are too often viewed as simplistic, 
frictionless institutions.12 In recognition of this shortfall, Neil 
Komesar, a prominent law and public policy scholar, has proposed a 
novel analytic approach to examine institutions comparatively and 
determine when intervention by one branch over another would 
offer a superior outcome.13 Though Komesar’s focus has not been 
directed specifically on the war on terror, his theory nevertheless 
provides a potential resolution to the issues surrounding the 
institutional tensions that have arisen within that context.  
This Comment thus explores institutional frictions and the 
development of legal policies related to detainee issues within the 
framework of Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis theory. In 
order to understand the value of comparative institutional analysis, 
Part II discusses previous attempts to determine “who decides” and 
explains why these theories have failed to fully resolve the problem of 
how and when decision-making power should be allocated to any 
specific branch of government. Part III explains Komesar’s 
comparative institutional analysis theory, and highlights ways in 
which this approach fills the gaps left by previous theories. Part IV 
applies Komesar’s theory to the institutional frictions that arose as 
detainee policies were created by the U.S. government. Part V 
concludes with the proposition that applying comparative 
institutional analysis to post-9/11 legal policies highlights the 
theory’s utility and can also serve to alleviate cynicism related to the 
development of law during times of crisis. 
 
 10. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries: 
Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 
(1996); Michael H. Page, Judging Without the Facts: A Schematic for Reviewing State Secrets 
Privilege Claims, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1267–75 (2008). 
 11. See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 233. 
 12. Id. at 39. 
 13. See id. at ix–x. 
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II. PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO “DECIDE WHO DECIDES” 
Because the Constitution is often vague as to how and when any 
particular branch of government may intervene into a particular 
issue, scholars have proposed a number of disparate approaches to 
resolve these questions. Most prominently, these have included 
attempts to assign power based on original intent, the protection of 
fundamental rights, law and economics, or institutional choice. 
Unfortunately, as the following survey reveals, though these efforts 
have provided some insight into the issue of who decides, each has 
failed to yield a wholly satisfactory answer. 
A. Original Intent 
Essentially, proponents of an original intent approach to 
allocation of powers suggest that deciding who decides ought to be 
done in accord with the intent of the Constitution’s Framers.14 
Adherents claim this is necessary because the Framers themselves 
ratified the Constitution with such a presupposition and expected 
their intent to inform future decision-making processes.15 Under this 
approach, proposals to vest authority in any particular branch based 
on the belief that it would be best suited to apply a philosophical or 
moral theory are generally rejected.16 “Thus, for example, although 
the Constitution emerged in the general context of modern natural 
rights theory, most originalists deny that the judiciary is therefore 
legitimately enabled to invoke such theory for creating rights beyond 
those enumerated in the document.”17 Instead, the original intent 
approach would suggest that the choice as to which institution 
should make a particular decision was decided long ago—by the 
Framers of the Constitution.18 
Though original intent certainly has influenced modern 
constitutional theory,19 its assumptions have been questioned and, 
 
 14. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885, 886 (1985). 
 15. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 365–66 (1977). 
 16. JOHNATHAN GEORGE O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 2 (2005). 
 17. Id. (citation omitted). 
 18. See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 197. 
 19. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 15, at 364 (arguing that theories beyond original 
intent constitute judicial attempts “to revise the Constitution”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:00:38 PM 
1339 Comparative Institutional Analysis 
 1343 
perhaps more importantly, its practical application has often fallen 
flat. Scholars assert, for example, that historical evidence does not 
support the notion that the Framers wished to impose their intent in 
perpetuity.20 Moreover, even if they did, the fact remains that 
“original intent” is not always discoverable.21 Difficulties related to 
ambiguities of language and the enterprise nature of the 
Constitution’s drafting make discerning intent nearly (if not entirely) 
impossible.22 More to the point, as pertaining to allocation of 
decision-making powers, “[t]he brief text of the Constitution offers 
little detail on specific substantive outcomes or even on institutional 
allocation; most of the detailed provisions in the Constitution 
concern institutional design.”23 In the end, therefore, while original 
intent may offer a starting point as to how decision-making authority 
should be divided amongst the branches, it fails to offer a completely 
cogent approach. 
B. Protection of Fundamental Rights 
In contrast to the original intent approach, proponents of 
fundamental rights analysis suggest that the desire to protect certain 
essential values, such as equality, liberty, and justice, ought to drive 
determinations about which branch should be allocated decision-
making powers.24 As used in the present context, the fundamental 
rights approach entails determining which branch of government 
could best preserve these rights and should, therefore, be given the 
relevant authority to do so. Usually, proponents of this theory 
support the proposition “that the Supreme Court should give 
content to the Constitution’s open-ended provisions by identifying 
 
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) (“While it may indeed be unrealistic to 
have substantial confidence that judges and lawyers will find the correct historical answer to 
such refined questions of original intent as the precise content of ‘the executive Power,’ for the 
vast majority of questions the answer is clear.”); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original 
Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986) (“[O]riginal intent is 
the only legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.”). 
 20. See Powell, supra note 14, at 948. 
 21. For an interesting post-9/11 example of this, see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229, 2244–51 (2008). There, after trying to discern whether the Framers would have 
intended for the writ of habeas corpus to extend to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Court 
declined to “infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on 
point.” Id. at 2251. 
 22. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 263. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. at 255–59. 
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and enforcing upon the political branches those values that are, by 
one formula or another, truly important or fundamental.”25 In 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for example, a plurality of the Court noted that 
“[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role 
for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”26 
Unfortunately, this approach also fails to fully address issues 
related to the separation of powers. For one thing, because there is 
no clear means of determining which values are essential, decision-
makers “can make serious mistakes in identifying fundamental 
rights.”27 One scholar has sardonically suggested, for instance, that 
the preeminent example of this is Lochner v. New York, when the 
Supreme Court held that the right of bakers to work more than sixty 
hours per week was fundamental.28 Decisions of this nature are 
indicative of the difficulties surrounding attempts to precisely discern 
fundamental rights, and can lead to skepticism that they even exist. 
Even more challenging, those rights generally thought of as 
fundamental are often in conflict with one another and there is no 
clear means of establishing a hierarchy as to which right is more 
fundamental. “[V]ague, idealized institutions” thus “easily support 
polar opposite constitutional responses” to the question of how best 
to protect these essential values.29 The institutional tensions related 
to detainee issues provide a perfect example of this, with the 
President operating to protect the liberty and security of the general 
American public and the Supreme Court intervening to check 
executive authority and preserve individual liberties.30 This conflict 
 
 25. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 43 
(1980) (emphasis added); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES §§ 1943-1946 (4th ed. 1873) (“When life and liberty are in question 
there must in every instance be judicial proceedings . . . .”). 
 26. 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). 
 27. DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 
175 (2007). 
 28. Id. 
 29. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 43. 
 30. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (responding to the dissenters’ claim that the majority had engaged in 
“triumphalism” by asserting that the authority of the executive “is necessarily limited by habeas 
corpus jurisdiction to enquire into the legality of executive detention”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557, 677 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for interrupting 
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highlights the fact that the “choice of social goals or values is 
insufficient to tell us [much] about law and public policy.”31 
C. Law and Economics 
Another approach to deciding who decides has been put forth by 
legal economists. While law and economics is a diverse and complex 
field, as relevant here, one of the discipline’s primary objectives is to 
maximize efficiency.32 Thus, in making determinations about which 
institution should be given authority to make various decisions, legal 
economists posit that the distribution should be based on a 
comparison of associated institutional costs. Law and economics was 
accordingly an early predecessor to institutional choice, since 
“[t]ransaction cost economics is inherently comparative.”33  
As an example, one might examine the costs associated with 
access to different institutions in order to determine which could 
most efficiently address a particular matter. Scholars have noted, for 
instance, that though Congress is “responsive to public pressure as 
reflected through the media and constituents,” legislative access 
usually depends on campaign contributions and political support.34 
Conversely, while not influenced by such interests groups, courts 
have their own access costs given the time and expense associated 
with the litigation process.35 The point, according to legal 
economists, is to evaluate the legal issue at hand to determine which 
institution could address it most efficiently in light of these costs. 
Despite the fact that law and economics analysis may result in the 
most efficient solution to a problem, the discipline has been widely 
criticized. Paramount among the critiques is the observation that 
 
military commissions the President had deemed necessary for national security); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528 (2004) (acknowledging “the tension that often exists between 
the autonomy that the Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a 
particular goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due before he is deprived of a 
constitutional right”). 
 31. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 271. 
 32. See Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas Mercuro, Law and Economics: Making the 
Case for a Broader Approach, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC 
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 3, 5 (Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas 
Mercuro eds., 2005). 
 33. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1413 (1996). 
 34. Yoo, supra note 3, at 592. 
 35. Id. 
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efficiency alone fails to account for principles of social justice.36 In 
other words, while it may be more costly for one particular 
institution to address a legal challenge, that institution may 
nevertheless offer other compelling advantages. Similarly, law and 
economics has also been disparaged for commodifying legal rights.37 
If rights truly are “fundamental,” it would thus be inappropriate to 
withhold them solely in the name of efficiency. Finally, detractors 
also note that, often, there is a failure to adequately capture all 
relevant costs and, consequently, sole reliance on an efficiency 
calculus inaccurately skews the decision allocation process.38 For 
these reasons, law and economics as a mechanism to decide who 
decides ultimately fails to provide wholly adequate guidance to those 
charged with resolving these difficult issues.  
D. Institutional Choice 
While the aforementioned approaches have failed to 
independently address the issue of “who decides,” each offers 
valuable insight into the process of allocating decision-making 
authority. In an effort to capture and build on those insights, “a 
new, unified methodology for legal scholarship based on the analysis 
of institutions” emerged in the mid-1990s.39 Essentially, institutional 
analysis calls for an examination of how various legal institutions 
operate and which would therefore be best suited to pursue certain 
objectives.40 Institutional choice theorists claim that achieving 
desired results occurs only if decision-making authority related to 
those goals is allocated to the “right” institution.41 The 
organizations relevant to this analysis depend on the legal issue at 
hand, but may include the market, judiciary, executive, legislature, 
administrative agencies, and perhaps even the international 
 
 36. See Duncan Kennedy, Law and Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal 
Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 470–71 (Peter 
Newman ed., 1998). 
 37. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
367, 367–68 (2009). 
 38. See Bernadette Atuahene, Things Fall Apart: The Illegitimacy of Property Rights in 
the Context of Past Property Theft, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 860 (2009). 
 39. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1424. 
 40. Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of 
Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591, 593 (1998). 
 41. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 5 (“It is institutional choice that connects goals with 
their legal or public policy results.”). 
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community. Once the relevant institutions are identified, their 
particular competencies must be examined in order to determine 
which can appropriately address any given legal quandary. For 
present purposes, an understanding of the more widely recognized 
institutional competencies of the executive, legislative, and judiciary 
is important. 
1. The executive 
Generally, the principal advantages of executive authority are that 
it can be exercised quickly, flexibly, and decisively.42 Moreover, given 
the centralized power of the executive branch, its actions are more 
unified, which is especially important in managing foreign affairs.43 
In times of war, the executive is often seen as the primary 
institutional actor because of the President’s constitutional role as 
commander-in-chief.44 Likewise, the executive is also generally 
presumed to be more informed about national security and foreign 
affairs issues. “Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided 
otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon 
the authority of the Executive in military and national security 
affairs.”45 This, of course, is counterbalanced by the fact that, in light 
of electoral politics, executive action is tempered by popular will. 
 
 42. See JAMES M. MCCORMICK, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY & PROCESS 293–94 
(2010). 
 43. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along with the 
necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign 
relations. They did so principally because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are 
essential in these domains.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
319 (1936) (“In th[e] vast external realm [of foreign affairs], with its important, complicated, 
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation.”); Yoo, supra note 3, at 598. 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Even in this area, there is debate, of course, as to how far 
inherent presidential authority extends. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 494 (2008); 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 45. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (emphasis added). But see 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (noting that the Supreme Court has “long since made clear that a 
state of war is not a blank check for the President”). 
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Indeed, “the President’s accountability to the popular will is the best 
means of ensuring that he will do a decent job.”46 
However, for all the advantages of executive authority there are 
several features that can be troubling. While centralized power may 
be useful, for instance, insofar as it results in unified action, this 
centralization also makes the executive authority ripe for abuse. As 
one Supreme Court Justice aptly noted, “though we live under the 
form of a republic we [can be] in fact under the absolute rule of a 
single man.”47 Relatedly, unified authority may also lead to secretive 
policymaking and associated abuses—especially those directed 
against minorities.48 For an example of this, one need not look 
beyond the war on terror. In late 2005, The New York Times broke a 
story regarding the executive decision to permit the National 
Security Agency to conduct warrantless wiretaps in the aftermath of 
9/11.49 While there were, perhaps, some members of Congress who 
were at least marginally aware of the program,50 by and large 
members expressed outrage at being “rolled” by the executive.51 
This example highlights the fact that while the executive has the 
 
 46. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 474 (1973) (arguing 
also that “the President’s duty is not to ignore and override popular concerns but to 
acknowledge and heed them”). 
 47. Letter from Justice Joseph Story to Hon. Judge Fay (Feb. 18, 1834), in 2 LIFE AND 
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, at 154 (William W. Story ed., 1851). See also Obama, supra note 
1 (“In our constitutional system, prolonged detention should not be the decision of any one 
man.”). 
 48. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 46, at xx–xxi.  
 49. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 50. Id. (noting that while it was unclear precisely “how much the members of Congress 
were told about the . . . program,” at least a few had been generally informed of it). 
 51. See, e.g., Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: The Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Implications of the National Applications Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec., 110th Cong. 59 (2007) (statement of Hon. Jane Harman, Member, H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec.). More fully, Rep. Harman observed that “we have been rolled on the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program in Congress. That thing was full blown before I as a member of 
the Gang of Eight was briefed on its operations.” Id. Rep. Harman also stated that the Bush 
administration “feels free to disregard the law Congress passes in exercising the President’s 
Commander in Chief authorities.” Id. (The Gang of Eight includes “the Speaker and Minority 
Leader of the House, the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate, and the Chairmen and 
Ranking Members of the Congressional Intelligence Committees.” REP. JOHN C. CONYERS, 
JR., THE HIGH CRIMES OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND A BLUEPRINT FOR 
IMPEACHMENT: DECEPTION, MANIPULATION, TORTURE, RETRIBUTION, ILLEGAL 
SURVEILLANCE, AND COVER-UPS 142 (2007)). 
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ability to quickly react to threats, the lack of deliberation may lead to 
uninformed—and perhaps even unconstitutional—responses.52 
2. The legislature 
By contrast, one of the strengths of the legislature is that its 
processes may lead to more deliberative and informed decision-
making. For example, Congress can call upon executive officials and 
other experts to conduct studies or hearings before enacting 
legislation.53 This arguably results in the avoidance of “imprudent 
wars that may be too costly and ineffective.”54 John Hart Ely has 
further argued that, as relating to the legislature’s constitutional role 
in war-making, “the point [is] not to exclude the executive from the 
decision—if the president’s not on board we’re not going to have 
much of a war—but rather to ‘clog’ the road to combat by requiring 
the concurrence of a number of people of various points of view.”55 
Another obvious advantage of the legislature is that, like the 
executive, it is designed to be responsive to popular will. In fact, the 
actions of legislators are thought to be even more representative, 
since they are more closely connected to the people.56 Finally, 
because they too are subject to the vagaries of the electoral process, 
the presumption is that legislators’ efforts will generally serve to 
advance the common good.57 
Again, however, though the Framers may have envisioned that 
constitutional design would eliminate biases within the legislature, 
the reality is that the institution’s operations often do fall prey to 
them. Most prominently, legislators have been criticized for 
 
 52. See, e.g., Benham Gharagozli, War of Words or a Regional Disaster? The (Il)legality 
of Israeli and Iranian Military Options, 33 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 203, 210 
(2010) (“[T]he Bush Doctrine is not only unnecessary and dangerous as a matter of public 
policy, but is also illegal.”); Dennis Jett, Thoughts on the Changing Face of International Law, 
21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 161, 167 (2009) (“The Bush administration undoubtedly used torture and 
committed other illegal acts during its so-called war on terror.”). 
 53. Yoo, supra note 3, at 593. 
 54. Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 
2512, 2516 (2006). These authors ultimately argue, however, that “[a] cursory review of 
previous American wars does not suggest that requiring congressional authorization before the 
use of force invariably produces better decision-making.” Id. at 2517. 
 55. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF 
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 4 (1993). 
 56. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture: 
Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1281 (2009). 
 57. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1397. 
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pandering to minority interest groups at the expense of the public’s 
welfare.58 Thus, a concentrated few are overrepresented in the 
eventual outcomes of legislative processes.59 Alternatively, the 
legislature may also be overly influenced by the “power of 
majoritarian influence [that] can severely skew political results and 
produce what might be termed majoritarian bias, [or] the 
overrepresentation of the many.”60 In these cases, though the 
minority usually suffers the greatest harm, “it simply cannot 
overcome the power of the majority to outvote them,” either 
because the minority’s voting polity is simply not large enough or 
because its members are altogether excluded from the voting 
process.61 Ultimately, if the legislative process suffers from either 
minoritarian or majoritarian bias, the “best” legislation is arguably 
sacrificed in order to satisfy a particular constituency.62 
3. The judiciary 
Given the biases just noted, the judiciary is often thought to 
protect individual liberty interests—especially of those in the 
minority—better than other institutions.63 The primary reason for 
this is that “courts are designed to be independent from politics, to 
passively allow parties to drive the litigation, and to receive 
information in highly formal ways through litigation. These 
 
 58. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 3, at 592 (“It is generally thought that interest groups 
must provide campaign contributions or political support in order to attain access to political 
leaders . . . .”). 
 59. See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 55–56. 
 60. Id. at 54. 
 61. L. Song Richardson, Convicting the Innocent in Transnational Criminal Cases: A 
Comparative Institutional Analysis Approach to the Problem, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 62, 93–
94 (2008). 
 62. It is worth noting, however, that these processes may in fact create the “best” 
legislation. Whether or not this is true depends, of course, on the values one expects to be 
preserved by the legislative process. 
 63. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (quoting United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)) (“[O]ne aspect of the judiciary’s 
role under the Equal Protection Clause [may be] to protect ‘discrete and insular minorities’ 
from majoritarian prejudice or indifference . . . .”); Tonja Jacobi, The Role of Politics and 
Economics in Explaining Variations in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 
205, 210 (2009) (“[T]he judiciary often protects minorities and disadvantaged groups.”); 
Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of Ideas, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 
1099 (2008) (“The independent judiciary embodied in the U.S. Constitution, at least 
according to most non-popular constitutionalist accounts, is designed to protect individuals 
and minorities from overreaching by the majority.”). 
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characteristics may make courts more neutral in their decision 
making and fairer in their attitude toward defendants or detainees.”64 
To the extent that its decisions are publicly available, and that 
citizens can witness proceedings, the judiciary’s decision-making 
process is also more transparent than that of the political branches.65 
Lastly, the judiciary is also generally thought to be more deliberative 
in its intervention and decision-making processes, which arguably 
leads to better results.66 
Conversely, however, the deliberativeness of the judiciary may 
make it ill-suited for dealing with certain issues—especially those 
surrounding national security and war-making. On the one hand, the 
contemplative approach of the judiciary may fail in times of crisis 
because such circumstances require rapid and agile responses to 
address threats faced by the nation. On the other hand, once the 
judiciary does choose to intervene, its margin for error is arguably 
smaller than that of other branches, since opportunities for self-
correction will be available with far less frequency.67 The judiciary’s 
purposive operations thus create situations where “[j]udicial errors or 
deviations from policy may take years to reverse or may even go 
entirely uncorrected.”68 Beyond issues of deliberativeness, the 
judiciary is also characterized as largely lacking in competence to 
address national security matters.69 This incompetence springs from 
the fact that judges are generalists and that many issues are political 
questions best left to other branches.70 Moreover, even if they 
possessed such competence, the relative lack of judicial resources 
 
 64. Yoo, supra note 3, at 591. 
 65. See Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does it Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 293, 301–
02 (2009) (“The judiciary plays an essential role in giving life to other values, such as 
predictability and transparency.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Congressional Devolution of Immigration Policymaking: 
A Separation of Powers Critique, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 157 (2007) (“The 
judiciary benefits . . . from a more reflective, deliberative lawmaking process.”). 
 67. Yoo, supra note 3, at 599. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Competence here is defined as the ability of judges “to investigate, understand, and 
make the substantive social decisions that may come to them.” KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 
138. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276–77 (2008) (“Unlike the President and 
some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal 
judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation 
and its people.”); Yoo, supra note 3, at 597; KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 138–42. But see 
Obama, supra note 1 (“Some have derided our federal courts as incapable of handling trials of 
terrorists. They are wrong.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Yoo, supra note 3, at 597. 
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makes it such that courts “cannot call their own number too 
often.”71 Finally, because the judiciary is often seen as the 
protectorate of minorities, it is frequently placed in the unenviable 
position of having to adjudicate issues related to fundamental rights. 
As alluded to above, defining such rights, and resolving conflicts 
between them, is extremely difficult, and courts’ attempts to do so 
have created skepticism about the actual neutrality of the judiciary.72 
In sum, institutional choice analysts would suggest that decision-
making authority for any specific issue ought to be allocated in light 
of these various institutional competencies. But while the theory has 
advanced legal scholarship by merging many of the underlying 
principles of the approaches outlined previously, it has also been the 
subject of criticism.73 Most notably, Komesar has asserted that 
“[s]implistic, frictionless institutional specifications always make 
institutional choice trivial and empty.”74 In other words, institutional 
choice alone fails because it views the decision-making process 
through the lens of “single institutionalism,” or, as a process that 
merely lists the advantages of one institution without making 
comparisons between them.75 This analysis ultimately proves fruitless, 
since “[s]imply cataloging the available institutions without engaging 
in any comparison amongst them leaves unanswered the questions of 
which institution will best serve the desired policy.”76 
III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Komesar developed comparative institutional analysis to fill the 
vacuum left by these previous theories. In contrast to simple 
institutional choice, Komesar’s theory calls for comparisons between 
 
 71. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 250. 
 72. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“One cannot 
help but think, after surveying the modest practical results of the majority’s ambitious opinion, 
that this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but about control of federal policy 
regarding enemy combatants.”). 
 73. See Richardson, supra note 61, at 69–70 (suggesting that institutional choice alone 
is insufficient, because “all institutions can fail under similar circumstances,” so a comparative 
view is necessary “to determine which is least likely to fail in a given context”). 
 74. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 39. 
 75. Id. at 199. For an important example of this, see Yoo, supra note 3, at 590–600. 
There, Yoo essentially offers a litany of reasons explaining why the judiciary lacks the capacity 
to address national security issues. While he calls his institutional analysis “comparative,” there 
is no real indication as to why another branch would be better at addressing such matters. Id. 
 76. Richardson, supra note 61, at 73 (emphasis added). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:00:38 PM 
1339 Comparative Institutional Analysis 
 1353 
institutions to determine which would be best suited to address a 
particular legal problem under a specific set of circumstances. 
“Under comparative institutional analysis, the appropriate question is 
not whether a particular institution works better in one setting than 
in another. Rather, the correct question is whether, in any given 
setting, one institution is better or worse than its available 
alternatives.”77 As suggested by the title of his book Imperfect 
Alternatives, Komesar begins with the assumption that every 
institution has its own malfunctions, and is therefore imperfect.78 In 
light of these malfunctions, deciding who decides becomes a choice 
of which institution, imperfect though it may be, has the highest 
likelihood of achieving the desired result. 
A full appreciation of the utility of comparative institutional 
analysis theory can be arrived at through a more thorough 
examination of some of the institutional malfunctions discussed 
above.79 As explained by Ely: 
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when 
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to 
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) 
though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives 
beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging 
some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to 
recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that 
minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative 
system.80 
Given these circumstances, Ely asserts that the political process is 
simply incapable of policing itself; therefore, the judiciary’s role is 
vital. While this conclusion seems intuitive, it rests on precisely the 
type of reasoning comparative institutional analysis challenges as 
overly simplistic. Such frictionless assessments “simply do not work 
in the complex world of institutional choice”81 because the judiciary 
itself also has malfunctions which ought to be accounted for. The 
question thus becomes how the impact of these malfunctions can be 
quantified and relatively compared so that the institution with the 
 
 77. Id. at 70. 
 78. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 6. 
 79. See supra notes 47–76 and accompanying text. 
 80. ELY, supra note 25, at 103. 
 81. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 201. 
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best chance of reaching the desired result is given the necessary 
authority to do so.  
When framed this way, it is easy to see why deciding who decides 
is so complex and situationally dependent. As one commentator has 
fittingly noted, society “cannot decide whether courts or legislatures 
can do a job better, in the abstract.”82 Indeed, though fundamental 
rights analysis on its own fails to entirely address questions about 
who should decide, the fact remains that even under comparative 
institutional analysis, the decision-making process will always be 
driven by the values people hope to protect. “One must know what 
the job is, [and] what values and goals one is trying to achieve or 
protect. Only then can one discuss whether people selected and 
sheltered—as judges are—make preferable decision makers to, say, 
people elected and exposed—as legislators are.”83 
IV. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS & DETAINEE LEGAL 
ISSUES 
This Part thus begins with the assumption that “the job” is to 
determine, using comparative institutional analysis principles, which 
institution within the U.S. government was best postured to address 
detainee issues at various points in the aftermath of 9/11. As 
mentioned above, this requires acknowledgement of the goals and 
values the American people wished to protect. Though there was no 
doubt some divergence amidst such a large polity, the principles of 
“freedom, fairness, equality, and dignity”84 will serve as guideposts 
for this analysis since the President has stated that these goals should 
drive U.S. policy.85 Beyond recognizing those values, however, one 
must also have an appreciation for the development of detainee 
policies, and the institutional malfunctions evident throughout their 
creation. 
 
 82. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to 
the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2124 (2003). 
 83. Id. at 2124–25. 
 84. Obama, supra note 1. 
 85. Importantly, these values exist in the American psyche in both the collective and 
individual sense, so individual liberty must be balanced against collective liberty interests 
preserved through national security. 
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A. Legal Framework for Detainee Issues 
One week after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress 
enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
granting the President authority “to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks . . . .”86 Though the AUMF did not explicitly authorize 
detention of combatants captured on the battlefield, the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.87 Recognizing the 
institutional tension created by its involvement in national security 
issues,88 however, the Court “answer[ed] only the narrow question” 
of whether those individuals like Hamdi—a U.S. citizen captured in 
a combat zone—could be detained pursuant to the AUMF.89 
Because the plurality determined that such detentions were 
fundamentally incident to war-making, and that “[a] citizen, no less 
than an alien,”90 could represent a force hostile to the United States, 
the majority held that Congress had inherently authorized such 
detentions via the AUMF.91 Just as importantly, the Court also 
noted that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when 
it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”92 Accordingly, the 
Court held that “due process demands some system for a citizen-
detainee to refute his classification” as an enemy combatant.93 Thus, 
while acknowledging the vital interest of the government to protect 
national security, the Court also asserted that “history and common 
sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the 
potential to become a means for oppression and abuse.”94  
 
 86. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 87. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 88. Id. at 520 (“We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the ‘war on 
terror,’ although crucially important, are broad and malleable.”). 
 89. Id. at 516. 
 90. Id. at 519. 
 91. Id. at 518. Given the statutory authority, the Court declined to address the 
constitutional question of whether such authorization was necessary in light of inherent 
authority the President may have as commander-in-chief. 
 92. Id. at 536. 
 93. Id. at 537.  
 94. Id. at 530. 
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The same day, the Court issued a similarly reasoned opinion in 
Rasul v. Bush.95 In Rasul, the majority held that federal courts had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate habeas corpus petitions filed by foreign 
nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.96 After a lengthy 
historical review of the purpose of the writ, the Court reached its 
conclusion based on the fact that “habeas corpus has served as a 
means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 
that context that its protections have been strongest.”97 In other 
words, the Court again appeared to rest its conclusion on its 
perceived duty to serve as a check against executive overreach. Such 
reasoning was criticized, however, by the dissenters.98 They argued 
that, in light of Congress’s superior institutional competence over 
national security issues, Congress, rather than the Court, should have 
addressed any perceived executive overreach.99 The fact that it failed 
to do so, the dissenters asserted, should have served as a signal that 
Congress evidently approved of the President’s actions.100 
Both the executive and legislature responded swiftly to these 
decisions. On July 7, 2004, just days after the Hamdi and Rasul 
decisions, the executive issued an order establishing procedures 
whereby detainees could challenge their designation as enemy 
combatants.101 To effect this purpose, the order created Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which essentially incorporated 
into their operational procedures the minimal due process 
protections the Court had required in Hamdi.102 Likewise, in 2005, 
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), essentially 
overruling Rasul by statutorily stripping federal courts of jurisdiction 
 
 95. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 96. Id. at 485. 
 97. Id. at 474 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 
 98. Id. at 488–506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by Justices 
Rehnquist and Thomas. 
 99. See id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, during oral argument, Justice Scalia had 
rhetorically asked: “Can we hold hearings to determine the problems that are bothering you? . 
. . We can’t call witnesses and see what the real problems are, can we, in creating this new 
substantive rule that we are going to let the courts create. Congress could do all that, though, 
couldn’t it?” Transcript of Record at 45–46, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-
334). 
 100. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 101. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary 
of the Navy (July 7, 2004) (http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf). 
 102. Id. 
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to hear habeas petitions filed by foreign nationals detained at 
Guantanamo Bay.103 
What apparently was not clear, however, was whether the DTA 
applied to cases pending at the time of its passage. In Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the Court answered this question with a resounding 
“no.”104 Perhaps more importantly, Hamdan also established that 
the military commissions that had been created to try detainees 
violated federal law largely because of their procedural departures 
from the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Geneva 
Conventions.105 While the Court accepted that the AUMF had 
“activated the President’s war powers . . . includ[ing] the authority 
to convene military commissions,” it found no indication that either 
the AUMF or DTA authorized an approach denying procedural 
safeguards contained in standard military commissions.106 
Again, Congress responded with great haste, passing the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA) within four months of the Hamdan 
decision.107 In addition to authorizing the military commissions that 
the executive had established for the war on terror, the MCA also 
clarified that federal courts were stripped of jurisdiction to hear 
habeas petitions of Guantanamo detainees, regardless of when their 
cases were filed.108 Notably, however, even as the MCA was being 
debated, several senators expressed concern about the bill.109 One 
specifically noted that the United States had lost its “moral 
compass,” while another stated that, though the MCA was “patently 
unconstitutional on its face,” he would nevertheless vote for the bill 
since “the court [would] clean it up.”110 
 
 103. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). 
 104. 548 U.S. 577, 584 n.15 (2006). 
 105. Id. at 567. 
 106. Id. at 594. 
 107. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed by 
Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at A1. 
 110. Id. In fact, one author has argued that “[i]n passing the MCA, Congress 
demonstrated that it does not just tolerate, but depends upon, the Court to be the primary, if 
not exclusive, interpreter and guardian of the Constitution, at least in the national-security 
context.” Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 284 (2008). 
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In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court did in fact clean it up.111 While 
the scope of the case precluded analysis of the validity of the military 
commissions authorized by the MCA, it did allow the Court to 
review the constitutionality of the Act’s denial of detainees’ rights to 
the writ of habeas corpus.112 In large part, the holding rested on the 
majority’s belief that the procedures related to the CSRTs did not 
provide adequate procedural protections to replace traditional habeas 
petitions.113 Thus, the Court stated that: 
Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, 
after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral 
review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in the usual course 
occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the 
outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own 
independence. These dynamics are not inherent in executive 
detention orders or executive review procedures.114 
Affirming that the Suspension Clause was “designed to protect 
against . . . cyclical abuses”115 and that the writ of habeas corpus is 
“the surest safeguard of liberty,”116 the Court held that Congress’s 
attempt to circumvent it via the MCA was unconstitutional.117 
Several issues remain unlitigated, but it is, of course, this 
institutional ping-pong that has created skepticism about the 
development of legal policies related to detainee issues. In the midst 
of the fog of war, no single institution seemed to know precisely 
what was appropriate or where to draw lines as to decision-making 
authority. The Court’s decisions “[gave] rise to the popular notion 
that the judiciary had thoroughly rebuked the executive branch,”118 
though the Court itself often seemed reluctant to engage in 
constitutional issues seemingly within its purview. Beyond the fact 
that the various branches were perhaps operating to achieve different 
goals, another explanation for this tension rests in the various 
malfunctions at play during the development of detainee policies. 
 
 111. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 112. Id. at 2240. 
 113. Id. at 2265. 
 114. Id. at 2269. 
 115. Id. at 2247. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2240. 
 118. Yoo, supra note 3, at 573. 
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B. Institutional Malfunctions Related to Detainee Issues 
Komesar has largely limited his analysis of malfunctions to those 
that occur within the market, or those within the political process 
that develop because of majoritarian and minoritarian biases. 
Though majoritarian biases have indeed played an instrumental role 
in the institutional frictions surrounding detainee policies, other 
malfunctions not specifically identified by Komesar also appear to 
have been important. This Part explores those malfunctions in order 
to set the stage for analyzing the comparative advantage of having 
any particular branch intervene—at any particular time—in detainee 
issues. 
1. Majoritarian biases 
One of the most obvious malfunctions evident in the creation of 
detainee legal policies has been the extreme majoritarian bias against 
detainees within the government’s political branches. This is not 
wholly surprising, given that those incarcerated were almost 
exclusively marginalized out of the political processes. While groups 
like the American Civil Liberties Union tried to lobby for detainee 
rights,119 their efforts evidently held little immediate sway over the 
legislature and executive. A comparison can be drawn to the general 
criminal defense lobby, about which one commentator said: “They 
could not credibly threaten activation of the majority. While they 
could bring politicians’ attention to the risk of convicting the 
innocent . . . legislators are aware that most citizens believe that 
those accused of crime have too many rights.”120 Likewise, it is 
hardly surprising that “[i]n the four months following 9/11, 97 
percent of all bills, resolutions, and amendments proposed by 
Congress, totaling more than 450 measures, were related to 
terrorism.”121 
Indeed, whatever deliberativeness may otherwise be attributable 
to Congress, in the midst of crisis legislators do not generally seem 
interested in holding hearings and gathering facts. Nothing has been 
more indicative of this disinterest during the war on terror than the 
speed with which Congress enacted the AUMF—just seven days 
 
 119. See American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/john-
adams-project-american-values (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
 120. Richardson, supra note 61, at 96. 
 121. Donohue, supra note 2, at 370 (citations omitted). 
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after the September 11th attacks. The primary explanation for this 
haste is that “at the time of an attack governments recalculate the 
‘security versus freedom’ framework . . . [and] the perceived security 
risks posed by terrorism dramatically increases and eclipses other 
types of security concerns (such as security from undue government 
interference or arbitrary power).”122 Moreover, the public at large 
likely makes the same calculation, and given electoral concerns, the 
majoritarian bias thrives. 
2. Conflicts of interest 
In somewhat related fashion, various conflicts of interests within 
institutional actors have created their own malfunctions as the 
government has created detainee policies. For example, the executive 
as commander-in-chief has the responsibility of protecting national 
security, and also of protecting the principles of individual liberty 
embodied by the Constitution. In light of the aforementioned 
majoritarian bias, and as evidenced by the Bush Administration’s 
detainee policies, the executive inclination appears to have been to 
err on the side of acting as commander-in-chief.123 This tension led 
Justice Souter in his Hamdi concurrence to observe that “[f]or 
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government 
asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest 
the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will 
to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory.”124 
Similarly, members of Congress affirm an oath that they will 
defend the Constitution against both foreign and domestic 
enemies.125 As noted above, in times of crisis legislators have a 
proclivity of trying to sustain this oath by passing hasty and extreme 
statutes.126 “[L]egislators hedge” against checking the President 
because “they are reluctant to hamstring the executive.”127 
Accordingly, they aggressively pass what they think will be temporary 
 
 122. Id. at 371–72. 
 123. For a similar argument related to the executive’s role as chief law enforcement 
officer, see Richardson, supra note 61, at 102. 
 124. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 125. U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/ 
Oath_Office.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
 126. Donohue, supra note 2, at 371–72. 
 127. Id. at 372. 
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measures in order to provide the executive the flexibility it needs.128 
Once these laws are enacted, though, they are difficult to repeal.129 
“New provisions thus become the baseline upon which further 
measures build to expand the executive authority and promise 
citizens more security at the expense of civil liberties.”130 Within the 
context of war on terror detentions this can be seen in the language 
authorized by Congress in the AUMF. More to the point, the 
AUMF’s sweeping grant authorizing the President to “use all 
necessary and appropriate force”131 in responding to the 9/11 
attacks has been a nagging thorn for those seeking protection from 
executive dictates.132 
3. Differing institutional foci 
Flowing from these principles is the idea that the executive and 
legislature have a different focus than the judiciary. While judicial 
decisions obviously have effect beyond the litigants of any particular 
case, the cases and controversies requirement serves largely to ensure 
that the Court is focused on an individual’s personal liberties. Even 
the dissenters in Boumediene, who claimed that the majority sought 
“control of federal policy regarding enemy combatants,” 
acknowledged that the decision was modest in other ways.133 On the 
other hand, the legislature and executive necessarily have a wider 
constituency and therefore a broader focus. This of course is not to 
suggest that one is, in some abstract sense, better, but it does serve 
to highlight that in different situations one institution may be better 
situated to address a certain issue in light of its particular institutional 
focus. 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 372–73. 
 131. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 
224 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 132. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 587 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the plurality “qualifies its recognition of the President’s authority [via the 
AUMF] to detain combatants in the war on terrorism” in ways inconsistent with the AUMF 
and other legal precedent). 
 133. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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4. Lack of competency 
A final set of systemic malfunctions worth mentioning is that 
each institution inherently possesses a certain ignorance regarding 
the issues surrounding the war on terror. As Richard Posner has said, 
“[j]udges aren’t supposed to know much about national security.”134 
For that reason, and others already explored,135 courts are often 
reluctant to engage in legal challenges related to national security, 
even though it may otherwise be prudent for them to do so. This 
obviously creates a situation, however, where the executive and 
legislature have free reign to engage in what may be illegal activity. 
From a more charitable perspective, even those actors operating in 
good-faith may also overstep constitutional authority based on a 
mistaken belief as to the precise contours of the law. The fact that 
the judicial opinions cited above were so divisive for the Court 
should be an indication that these issues were not easily resolvable, 
especially to those lacking the competence of the judiciary over 
constitutional interpretation. 
C. So, Who Should Have Decided? 
“For the legal process school, institutions possessed fixed 
identity, and the task of assigning roles to them was like a game of 
animal, vegetable, or mineral.”136 As evidenced by the post-9/11 
institutional malfunctions, however, comparative institutional 
analysis suggests that there was no perfect solution as to which 
branch of government should have addressed detainee issues at any 
given moment in the aftermath of 9/11. Thus, while many believe 
the Court should have interjected itself more aggressively to protect 
individual liberties, the judiciary’s own limitations prove that 
“[i]nstitutional superiority is not always obvious, and superiority is 
often a choice of bad over worse.”137 With this perspective, though 
the development of detainee legal policies at times appeared 
meandering and unclear, the system of checks and balances appears 
to have worked precisely as it should have. 
 
 134. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 37 (2006). 
 135. See supra notes 63–76 and accompanying text. 
 136. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1428. 
 137. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 255. 
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1. September 11th and the AUMF 
In the first instance, it seems imminently appropriate for the 
executive to be vested with a certain degree of authority to act 
independently and without delay in times of national crisis. While in 
normal circumstances such aggressive responses as those embodied 
in President Bush’s detainee policies may prove objectionable, 9/11 
spawned an “unconventional war,”138 the precise parameters of 
which were immediately unclear even to those with the most 
national security competence. Moreover, although the President may 
possess inherent constitutional authority to act in such true 
emergencies,139 the fact is that here, Congress had granted the 
executive sweeping authority to address the national threat via the 
AUMF.140  
All of this seems to have rightly occurred without judicial 
intervention, because there is nothing to suggest that, up to that 
point, the courts could have done a better job of meeting the twin 
goals of protecting national security and preserving civil liberties. 
Also, given the judiciary’s general incompetence in dealing with 
national security policy, it seems prudent to have expected the 
judiciary to yield to the executive and legislature in the immediate 
aftermath of a related threat. This is because the “efficacy—the 
consequences generally—of a security measure adopted to deal with 
a novel threat cannot be determined if the measure is blocked early 
on by a constitutional interpretation. The post-9/11 responses to 
the newly apprehended terrorist threat [were] entitled to a chance to 
prove themselves—good or bad.”141 
2. Hamdi and Rasul 
Eventually, though, detentions became less abstract matters of 
national security policy and more individualized infringements on 
personal liberties. Hamdi was no longer a nameless, faceless, 
potential terrorist, but rather a U.S. citizen incarcerated for over two 
 
 138. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004). 
 139. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 140. Perhaps Congress’s authorization was not necessary as an antecedent to action, but 
it certainly imbued the executive’s activity with far more legitimacy. See id. 
 141. POSNER, supra note 134, at 37. 
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years without formal charges or proceedings.142 Likewise, by the time 
of their case, the petitioners in Rasul had been detained at 
Guantanamo Bay for over two years without facing charges.143 Any 
institutional advantage provided by the executive’s ability to quickly 
comprehend and respond to a national security threat became less 
meaningful as detentions like those represented in Hamdi and Rasul 
dragged on. Moreover, despite cries to the contrary, the Court went 
to great lengths to limit the scope of its holdings. Though it 
determined in Hamdi, for example, that some sort of due process 
was required for detentions, it explicitly indicated that given the 
exigencies of war “enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to 
alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time 
of ongoing military conflict.”144 In further recognition of the 
executive’s authority over war-making, the Court also avoided the 
more extreme question potentially presented by Rasul as to what 
process may be due those captured and incarcerated within the 
combat zone itself. But despite the Court’s reservations in those 
areas, its intervention became necessary for Guantanamo detainees 
because “as the period of detention stretch[ed] from months to 
years, the case for continued detention to meet military exigencies 
[became] weaker.”145 
Thus, comparative institutional analysis seems to indicate that 
judicial intervention was appropriate at the time of Hamdi and 
Rasul. Obviously the Court’s involvement advanced the goal of 
protecting individual liberty. On the other hand, as the Court itself 
noted, it was unlikely that the basic process called for by the majority 
in Hamdi, or the habeas reviews mandated in Rasul, would “have 
the dire impact on the central functions of warmaking that the 
Government forecasts.”146 While the dissenters criticized the 
judiciary for making such forecasts in light of the Court’s 
institutional incompetence in national security matters, the criticism 
is misplaced. Simply because judges are generalists (by design) does 
not imply that they are incapable of becoming competent. In fact, 
the very framework under which the judicial system operates is one 
in which a litigant must convincingly prove his case to the trier of 
 
 142. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 143. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004). 
 144. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
 145. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 146. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534. 
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fact. To the extent that the executive truly believed that judicial 
interference would outweigh individual liberty interests, it simply 
failed to prove it. Indeed, this is likely exactly what happened, given 
that the executive itself could not precisely measure any potential 
threat posed by providing the limited procedural protections called 
for in these cases. In contrast, however, the threat to individual 
liberties was perfectly clear. As the Hamdi Court notes, “detention 
could last for the rest of [a detainee’s] life.”147 While such extreme 
measures may have been appropriate in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11, after two years the least the Court could do was impose 
minimal procedural requirements on the executive. 
Finally, while the issues underlying Hamdi and Rasul could 
arguably have been left to the political processes of the executive and 
legislature, as highlighted above, malfunctions within those systems 
made such reliance impractical. In a majoritarian system, minorities 
are marginalized and lack the voice necessary to promote change. 
Judicial intervention may therefore be necessary when the 
malfunctions are so egregious—as here—that change cannot wait for 
the voting cycle or for the majority to become more informed or 
enlightened. 
3. Hamdan and Boumediene 
As with Hamdi and Rasul, the tipping point for judicial 
intervention in Hamdan and Boumediene seems to have been 
connected to the length of both the war on terror and the detainees’ 
incarceration. By the time his case was decided in 2006, Hamdan 
had been in U.S. custody for nearly five years. Moreover, the Court 
noted that at least some of the petitioners in Boumediene had been 
detained for six years “without the judicial oversight that habeas 
corpus or an adequate substitute demands.”148 Perhaps just as 
importantly, there was recognition by at least one member of the 
Court that the nature of the war on terror was fundamentally 
different than previous wars, and that institutional roles needed to 
adapt accordingly. Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that 
“[b]ecause our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited 
duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war 
powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose 
 
 147. Id. at 520. 
 148. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008). 
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dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have 
this luxury.”149 Despite this sweeping language, the Court still took a 
measured approach. It did not, for example, address any potential 
claim as to whether the CSRT procedures created after Hamdi were 
sufficient to satisfy due process. Likewise, the Court did not ban the 
use of military commissions altogether; it simply imposed a 
requirement that they be conducted in accord with existing law. 
Again, applying comparative institutional analysis principles to 
these issues seems to suggest that it was wholly appropriate for the 
Court to intervene as it did. This is perhaps especially true in light of 
the fact that even some within the legislature were, by this time, 
calling upon the Court to clean up the mess related to detainee 
issues.150 Though times of crisis may in fact call for limitations on 
civil liberties, the necessity for such detentions without process 
inevitably became less pronounced as the war on terror continued. 
On this account, it is critical to underscore that the Court never 
suggested that detainees should be released or that there was 
necessarily cause to question their detention. Instead, the Court 
simply established that in order to preserve the nation’s goals of 
liberty, equality, and justice, detainees should have been afforded an 
opportunity to challenge their incarceration. With the executive’s 
detention policies, as well as the DTA and MCA passed by Congress, 
it is plainly obvious that no other institution was doing much to 
preserve those values for the detainees themselves. Conversely, given 
the limited nature of the Court’s involvement and the executive’s 
continued bias toward aggressive protection of national security, the 
appropriate balance seemed to have been struck. “Valid institutional 
comparison calls upon the courts to function when they can do a 
better job,”151 which is precisely what the Supreme Court did in 
both Hamdan and Boumediene. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, detainee issues during the war on terror have 
presented vexing constitutional challenges to the institutional actors 
within the U.S. legal system. Given the oft-competing goals of 
protecting both national security and individual liberty, the 
 
 149. Id. at 2277. 
 150. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 151. KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 149. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:00:38 PM 
1339 Comparative Institutional Analysis 
 1367 
development of the legal framework surrounding detainee issues 
necessarily resulted in a certain degree of friction. While it is easy to 
view this friction during times of crisis with cynicism, comparative 
institutional analysis supports the proposition that in the aftermath of 
9/11 the constitutional system operated essentially as it was 
designed to operate. It has been observed that “[l]iberty and security 
can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the 
framework of the law.”152 This is not to suggest, however, that the 
reconciliation process will always run smoothly. Instead, each 
opportunity to “decide who decides” will require an analysis of the 
institutional competencies of each organization and a comparison 
between other alternatives. As evidenced by the development of the 
law related to detainees, there is no perfect solution as to who 
decides. But engaging in comparative institutional analysis can lead 
to the conclusion that, in light of everything known about a 
problem, the institution with the best chance of achieving the 
entirety of a nation’s goals has been left to decide the problem. 
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